Abstract. We present Arrow Update Logic, a theory of epistemic access elimination that can be used to reason about multi-agent belief change. While the belief-changing "arrow updates" of Arrow Update Logic can be transformed into equivalent belief-changing "action models" from the popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic approach, we prove that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. Further, since many examples of belief change are naturally thought of from Arrow Update Logic's perspective of eliminating access to epistemic possibilities, Arrow Update Logic is a valuable addition to the repertoire of logics of information change. In addition to proving basic results about Arrow Update Logic, we introduce a new notion of common knowledge that generalizes both ordinary common knowledge and the "relativized" common knowledge familiar from the Dynamic Epistemic Logic literature.
§1. Introduction. Public Announcement Logic is a modal logic theory for reasoning about multi-agent belief changes brought about by completely trustworthy announcements. This logic generally comes in two flavors: Plaza's (1989 Plaza's ( , 2007 logic, in which a public announcement of a statement eliminates all epistemic possibilities in which the statement does not hold, and Gerbrandy & Groeneveld's (1997) logic, in which a public announcement of a statement merely eliminates access to all epistemic possibilities in which the statement does not hold. The most popular Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), due to Baltag et al. (1998) or "BMS" (see also Baltag & Moss, 2004; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) , generalizes Plaza's logic by eliminating epistemic possibilities that do not satisfy certain preconditions. However, many examples of epistemic or doxastic update are naturally thought of in terms of merely eliminating access to such possibilities.
In this paper, we present Arrow Update Logic (AUL), a theory of epistemic access elimination that generalizes Gerbrandy and Groeneveld's logic of public announcements. AUL is inspired by the arrow precondition language proposed by Renne et al. (2009 Renne et al. ( , 2010 ; there are also connections to the work of Renardel de Lavalette (2004) and of Aucher et al. (2009) on accessibility relation change and to the work of van Benthem (2005) on arbitrary arrow elimination.
In the Arrow Update Logic we present in this paper, we shall restrict ourselves to very simple arrow updates in which epistemic arrows are merely eliminated; no new arrows will be created. Accordingly, while agents may have different beliefs and different ways of processing incoming information, it is common knowledge among the agents how each agent will process the incoming information. We will revisit this restriction at the end of the paper.
To motivate Arrow Update Logic, we observe that it is natural to think of certain belief changes in terms of eliminating arrows. For example, let us consider a van Ditmarsch (2000) card-playing scenario: the cards r, w, and b are dealt to agents 1, 2, and 3, one card per agent. A Kripke model M representing this situation is pictured on the left in Figure 1 . In this picture, each world is labeled by an expression c 1 c 2 c 3 , which represents the deal in which agent 1 is dealt card c 1 ∈ {r, w, b}, agent 2 is dealt card c 2 ∈ {r, w, b}, and agent 3 is dealt card c 3 ∈ {r, w, b}. Solid arrows are reserved for agent 1, dashed arrows for agent 2, and dotted arrows for agent 3. To have an agent's arrow point between two worlds means that the agent in question cannot distinguish between the deals represented by the two worlds. Now suppose that all the agents look at their own cards, an action we denote by pickup. After this action, it is common knowledge that each agent knows her own card but does not know the cards of the other agents. We represent the situation after this action using a Kripke model M * pickup pictured on the right in Figure 1 .
Note that a natural way to obtain M * pickup from M is to simply delete arrows. To specify which arrows to delete, we can simply say which arrows are to remain, with the understanding that all other arrows are to be deleted. To say that an agent-a arrow from world w to world w should remain, we will use a triple of the form (ϕ, a, ψ), where the expression ϕ describes a condition to be satisfied by the source world w, the expression a names the agent, and the expression ψ describes a condition to be satisfied by the target world w . We collect together a number of such arrow specifications in the set pickup defined by pickup def = {(c a , a, c a ) | c ∈ {r, w, b} and a ∈ {1, 2, 3}} , where c a is the condition "agent a has card c." The set pickup describes all arrows that connect worlds in which an agent has the same card. Intuitively, after the agents look at their cards, only the arrows described by pickup should remain: each agent knows her own card (and hence we should delete arrows between worlds in which her card is different because she can distinguish these worlds), but she does not know the cards of the others (and hence we should maintain arrows between worlds in which she has the same card but the others' cards may be different because she cannot distinguish these worlds). The basic idea we put forward in this paper is that a finite set of triples such as pickup is an arrow-changing prescription called an arrow update that can be reasoned about within a doxastic modal logic. We develop such a logic and call it AUL.
After presenting the language and semantics (Section §2) and the axiomatics (Section §3) of AUL, we show that arrow updates can be transformed into DEL action models (Section §4). We work out a number of examples of arrow updates (Section §5) and then prove our key result: arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models (Section §6). We then outline a common knowledge extension of AUL called AUL * (Section §7), and conclude with directions for further research. §2. Language and semantics. DEFINITION 2.1 (Agents, Propositional Variables). We fix a nonempty finite set A of agents, and we fix an at most countable set P of propositional variables. DEFINITION 2.2 (AUL Language). Grammar G is defined as follows.
We will often omit parentheses around expressions when doing so ought not cause confusion. Expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G are called AUL-formulas (or just formulas); we let F denote the set of formulas. Given formulas ϕ and ϕ and an agent a ∈ A , the syntactic object (ϕ, a, ϕ ) is called an a-arrow specification (or just an arrow specification) and is said to have source condition ϕ, label a, and target condition ϕ . Expressions built using U as a start symbol in grammar G are called AUL-arrow updates (or just arrow updates); we let U denote the set of arrow updates. We identify an arrow update U ∈ U with the finite nonempty set of arrow specifications defined by writing setformation brackets around U . Expressions written using propositional connectives other than ∧ and ¬ are to be understood as abbreviations for formulas in the usual way. Given an agent a ∈ A , an arrow update U ∈ U , and a formula ϕ ∈ F , the expression 3 a ϕ abbreviates the formula ¬2 a ¬ϕ and the expression U ϕ abbreviates the formula ¬[U ]¬ϕ. An update modal is an expression [U ] for which U ∈ U . To say that a formula is reduced means that the formula does not contain update modals.
The formula 2 a ϕ is assigned the informal reading "agent a believes ϕ." The formula [U ]ϕ is assigned the informal reading "after arrow update U , formula ϕ is true."
The AUL language is interpreted on Kripke models. To see how the semantics works, consider our card example from the previous section. We define the set A of agents, the set C of cards, the set P of propositional variables, the Kripke model M, and the arrow update pickup as follows.
DEFINITION 2.3 (Kripke Model). To say that M is a Kripke model means that M is a tuple
For convenience, we identify each function w ∈ W M with the expression w(1)w(2)w(3). Hence rwb ∈ W M is the function of type A → C satisfying rwb(1) = r, rwb(2) = w, rwb(3) = b. Model M is pictured on the left in Figure 1 . Assuming that "rwb" is the deal, let us check that agent 1 believes that she has card r after the agents pick up their cards. That is, we verify that M, rwb | [pickup]2 1 r 1 . Proceeding, it follows by the definition of M * pickup that
from which it follows that M * pickup, rwb | 2 1 r 1 . (Model M * pickup is pictured on the right in Figure 1 .) But then it follows by the semantics that M, rwb | [pickup]2 1 r 1 , as desired. §3. Theory. In this section, we define an axiomatic theory called AUL that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics from the previous section. The completeness proof follows the reduction axiom method of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998; Gerbrandy, 1999; Plaza, 2007; van Benthem et al., 2006; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) . Before we define the theory AUL, we first introduce a notion of arrow update composition. Axioms U1-U5 are called reduction axioms. When reading these axioms from left to right, we note that the "complexity" of the formulas to which the update modal applies decreases; in U1, the update modal is eliminated entirely. As for the intuitive meanings of the reduction axioms, U1 says that atomic facts about the world do not change due to arrow updates. U2 expresses the fact that arrow updates are functional: there is only one way that an arrow update can update a Kripke model. U3 says that arrow updates distribute over conjunction. U4 characterizes an agent's beliefs after an arrow update in terms of her beliefs before the update: a believes ϕ after arrow update U if and only if [U ] ϕ is true in all of the worlds that can be reached by an a-arrow satisfying an a-arrow specification in U . 1 Axiom U5 says that the effect of a sequence of two arrow updates is equivalent to the effect of their composition. 1 To say that an a-arrow (w, w ) ∈R M a in a Kripke model M satisfies an a-arrow specification (ϕ, a, ϕ) means that the source condition ϕ is true at (M, w) and the target condition ϕ is true at (M, w ).
Proof. By induction on the length of derivation in AUL. We restrict our attention to the base cases for Axioms U4 and U5; the other cases are straightforward. We begin with the proof that the left-to-right implication of Axiom U4 is valid. Proceeding, choose an arbitrary pointed Kripke model (M, w) satisfying M, w | [U ]2 a ϕ and choose an arbitrary a-arrow (ψ, a, χ) ∈ U such that M, w | ψ. It follows by the semantics that for each v ∈ R M * U a (w), we have (M * U ), v | ϕ. But the latter is equivalent to the following:
. Conclusion: the left-to-right implication of Axiom U4 is valid. Let us now argue that the right-to-left implication is valid. Choose an arbitrary pointed Kripke model (M, w) satisfying
To prove that M,
We now turn to the base case for Axiom U5. We will show that the axiom is sound by showing that (M * U ) * U = M * (U • U ) for any Kripke model M. It is clear that the sets of possible worlds of these models are identical and so are the valuations. So it remains to be shown that for all worlds w and agents a that R
Take an arbitrary w and a and suppose that v ∈ R
Moreover we can conclude that v ∈ R M a (w) and there must also be an arrow specification (ϕ, a,
(w). This argument also works the other way around. Therefore R
Now choose an arbitrary pointed Kripke model (M, w) and suppose that M,
The argument also holds the other way around. Hence Axiom U5 is valid.
Our proof of the completeness of AUL generally follows the proof in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) . In particular, we begin by defining a notion of formula and arrow update "complexity" and then prove by induction on the complexity of formulas that every formula is provably equivalent to a reduced (i.e., update modalfree) formula. This allows us to reduce the completeness of AUL to the completeness of its underlying multimodal logic K (AUL without U1-U5 and UN and applied to reduced formulas only).
DEFINITION 3.4 (AUL Complexity). We define a function c : (F
Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulas, one can show that the equations in Table 2 define a function r : F → F . To show this, one of the key results that one must argue is that the equations in Table 2 are complexity respecting, by which we mean that r is applied on the left side of an equation to a syntactic object whose complexity is strictly greater than any syntactic object on the right side of the equation to which r is applied. Arguing the equations are complexity respecting is a tedious exercise in reasoning with inequalities; we only prove that c(
To prove the statement of the theorem, one then argues by induction on the complexity k of formulas that for each formula θ having c(θ) ≤ k, it follows that θ ↔ r (θ). The argument is broken up into a number of cases, one for each of the forms to which r is applied on the left side of an equation in Table 2 . 
) by the induction hypothesis-which is applicable because the equations in Table 2 are complexity respecting-and modal reasoning. By Axiom U4, the definition of r , and propositional logic, it follows that
[U ]2 a ϕ ↔ r ([U ]2 a ϕ). The other cases are handled similarly. THEOREM 3.6 (AUL Completeness). | ϕ implies AUL ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F .
Proof. Suppose we are given an arbitrary ϕ ∈ F satisfying | ϕ. By Soundness (Theorem 3.3) and Reduction (Theorem 3.5), it follows that | r (ϕ). Since r (ϕ) is reduced, we have K r (ψ) by the completeness of the multi-modal logic K (Blackburn et al., 2001) and hence AUL r (ϕ) because AUL extends K. Applying Reduction once more, it follows by propositional reasoning that AUL ϕ. §4. Arrow updates and action models. In this section, we show every arrow update has the "same effect" as a certain action model of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Devised by Baltag et al. (1998) , an action model is a Kripke model-like object that describes the agents' beliefs about incoming information. Instead of a set of possible worlds, an action model A has a set E A of possible "events," each of which comes with an assertion pre A (e), called the precondition, that might be made. But the agents are uncertain as to which assertion will in fact be made: given an agent a and an event e, there is a set R A a (e) of events whose preconditions the agent thinks might have been asserted whenever the precondition pre A (e) of event e is in fact asserted. In this way, an action model represents a set of possible events, each of which conveys the information content of a certain assertion, but the agents are uncertain as to which event is taking place.
DEFINITION 4.1 (Action Model). Let F be a set of formulas. To say that A is an F-action model means that A is a tuple (E
A , R A , pre A ) consisting
of a nonempty finite set E A whose members will be called events in A, a function R
A : A × E A → ℘ (E A ) mapping each agent-event pair (a, e) ∈ A × W A to a set R A a (e) ∈ ℘ (W A ) of
events in A, and a function pre A : E A → F mapping each event e ∈ E A to a formula pre A (e) ∈ F called the precondition of e. A multi-pointed F-action model is a pair (A, E) consisting of an action model and a set E ⊆ E A of events; each e ∈ E is called a point of (A, E). If F is a set of formulas, then we write A(F ) to denote the set of multi-pointed F -action models.
The points E of a multi-pointed action model (A, E) represent the set of possible events that may be executed according to a nondeterministic choice. The language of DEL is obtained from that of multi-modal logic by adding multi-pointed action modals as modalities. DEFINITION 4.2 (DEL Language). We define grammar G 0 as follows.
We define F 0 to be the set of expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G 0 . Then, whenever F k is defined, we define grammar G k+1 as follows.
We define F k+1 to be the set of expressions built using ϕ as a start symbol in grammar G k+1 . Finally, we define the set F DEL def = k∈N F k whose members will be called DELformulas. We adopt conventions and terminology similar to those established for the AUL language (Definition 2.2). To say that a DEL-formula ϕ is reduced means ϕ ∈ F 0 . An action model is an
The language of DEL is also interpreted on Kripke models. The core semantic definition is the so-called product update (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998) , which determines the truth of a formula [ A, E] 
Validity for DEL-formulas is defined as for AUL-formulas (Definition 2.4).
By Theorem 3.5 and by a similar theorem for DEL (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) , AUL and DEL can each be reduced to the underlying multi-modal logic K, by which we mean that each formula from either system is semantically equivalent to a K-formula. (The K-formulas are just the reduced formulas-the members of F 0 .) This tells us that each of AUL and DEL may be viewed as a repackaging of K. However, things are not so simple: the translation from DEL to K will bring about an exponential blow-up of certain formulas (Lutz, 2006) , and it would be surprising if the same were not the case for AUL (though whether it is indeed the case is an open question we leave for future work).
While the common K-link provides one connection between AUL and DEL, we now wish to study another. In particular, we wish to understand the relationship between AUL's arrow updates and DEL's action models. As a first step in understanding this relationship, we will show that every arrow update can be transformed into an action model that has the "same effect." This relates arrow updates to action models, telling us that every arrow update is expressible by an action model. An open question for future work is to characterize the reverse expressive relationship: which action models are expressible using arrow updates?
Our sense of an action model having the "same effect" as an arrow update is given by the following notion of update equivalence, which is a simple adaptation of a related notion of action equivalence from Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van Eijck et al., 2008) 
To say that is maximal U -consistent means that is a consistent U -set and any U -set ⊃ is inconsistent. 
Proceeding, choose an arbitrary v ∈ W M and let ϕ i n i=0 be an enumeration of (U ). For each i ∈ N with i ≤ n, define the formula ψ v i by setting 
U -consistency that there is a j ∈ N with j ≤ n such that either ϕ j ∈ and ¬ϕ j ∈ v or else ¬ϕ j ∈ and ϕ j ∈ v , but each of these possibilities implies M, v | r . We conclude that v is the unique maximal U -consistent U -set satisfying M, v | r v . To prove the statement of the theorem, define the function f :
It follows by what we showed in the previous paragraph that f is a bijection; in particular, we see that
a (v) and ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ ) ∈ U such that M, v | ϕ and M, v | ϕ , which is equivalent to the statement that v ∈ R M a (v) and ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ ) ∈ U such that ϕ ∈ v and ϕ ∈ v . But the latter is equivalent to the statement that
, the statement at the end of the previous sentence is equivalent to (v , v , v ) ). Finally, we observe that for each p ∈ P, we have We note that the construction from Definition 4.6 yields an action model A[U ] that is exponentially larger than the equivalent arrow update U . In Section §6, we will see that sometimes it is not possible to avoid this exponential blow-up. Therefore, while the belief changes described by arrow updates are also describable using action models, arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models in describing belief changes. §5. Examples. In this section, we show how public announcements are captured in AUL and give an example of a belief change operation whose arrow update implementation is obvious but whose action model implementation is difficult to discern.
Public announcements.
A public announcement of an assertion ϕ is generally realized in one of two ways: Plaza's (2007) operation p(ϕ) that deletes all ¬ϕ-worlds (and thereby arrows that target such worlds) and Gerbrandy & Groeneveld's (1997) operation g(ϕ) that deletes all arrows whose target is a ¬ϕ-world but does not delete any worlds. In AUL the operation g(ϕ) is implementable using an arrow update we call APUB(ϕ). To describe Plaza's announcements using Gerbrandy and Groeneveld's announcements (and hence using arrow updates), let F PUB be the set of all formulas that can be formed after we extend the AUL-formula formation grammar G (Definition 2.2) by adding the following formula formation rule: from formulas ϕ and ψ, form the formula [ϕ] p ψ. The definition of the semantical relation | for F PUB -formulas is obtained by extending the semantics for AUL-formulas (Definition 2.4) by adding the following inductive clause (Plaza, 2007; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) .
Note that in the above equivalence, the expression [ϕ] p ψ on the left-hand side is a formula and the expression M[ϕ] p on the right-hand side is the Kripke model defined in Definition 5.1. 3 It is not difficult to see that
Hence both Plaza's and Gerbrandy and Groeneveld's announcements can be expressed using arrow updates.
Cautious update and lying.
We begin with a retelling of the well-known surprise exam paradox (Clark, 2007) .
A teacher tells her students that there will be a surprise exam on a weekday next week. The students reason as follows: "The exam cannot take place on Friday because we would know on Thursday night that the exam would take place on Friday and it would not then be a surprise. Therefore Thursday is the last possible day for the exam. But then the exam cannot take place on Thursday because we would know on Wednesday night that the exam would take place on Thursday and it would not then be a surprise. Therefore Wednesday is the last possible day for the exam." Continuing their reasoning in this way, the students rule out all week-days, concluding that the exam cannot take place at all. The teacher was lying! But then, much to the students' surprise, the exam takes place on Tuesday. Gerbrandy (2007) analyzed this paradox in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, showing that the statement the teacher makes may be true. Here our focus is on another aspect of the paradox: what happens to the students' beliefs when they conclude that the teacher is lying?
A student who believes the teacher is lying ought not change her beliefs upon hearing what the teacher says; otherwise, if the student does not think the teacher is lying, then it is reasonable to accept what the teacher says. Put another way: if the student believes the teacher's statement to be false, then the student should ignore the statement and leave her beliefs unchanged; otherwise, if the student believes that the teacher's statement might be true, then the student should trust the teacher and update her beliefs by accepting what the teacher has said. However, in a multi-agent setting, things are a bit more complicated: a student must not only decide whether to process the information in terms of her own beliefs but must also take into account the fact that it is common knowledge that the other students must make their own decisions based on their respective beliefs. This leads to a cautious yet eager belief change policy that we call cautious updating. Steiner (2006) first studied cautious updating as a model-changing operation in its own right. However, cautious updates are in fact a special case of arrow updates.
DEFINITION 5.4 (Cautious Update). Given a formula ϕ, the cautious update with ϕ is the arrow update CU(ϕ) defined by setting
The idea is that when an agent a believes at a world w that ϕ is false, the a-arrows leaving w should remain-thereby leaving her beliefs about ϕ unchanged at w-because she rejects information she believes to be false. But if an agent believes at w that ϕ might be true, then all a-arrows from w to a non-ϕ world should be deleted-thereby causing her to accept ϕ at w-because she accepts information that she believes might be true.
While it is easy to construct an arrow update for cautious updating-indeed, the arrow update CU(ϕ) comes quite naturally from the intuitive description of what the cautious update with ϕ ought to do-it is difficult to construct a multi-agent action model for cautious updating. Perhaps illustrative of this difficulty, we see that the action model A[CU(ϕ)] (Definition 4.6) for the two-agent case A = {1, 2} with neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ inconsistent is already quite complicated: see Figure 3 , in which we have simplified the labeling of nodes by omitting occurrences of formulas that are AUL-provably equivalent to other formulas already in the set.
We note that the action model in Figure 3 contains "spurious arrows": if M is a Kripke model, 2 a ¬ϕ is a conjunct of a precondition of an event e ∈ E A[CU(ϕ)] , and ϕ is a conjunct of a precondition of another event e ∈ E A[CU(ϕ)] , then there will never be an a-arrow from a world in M [A[CU(ϕ) ]] of the form (w, e) to a world in M [A[CU(ϕ) 
a (w) and hence w / ∈ R M a (w). Therefore such "spurious arrows" may be deleted, yielding a "reduced" action model A [CU(ϕ)] that is update equivalent to
Cautious updating is a natural way to react to information that comes from a generally trustworthy but occasionally faulty source: accept the information if you believe it might be true and reject the information if you believe it is false. In particular, if the source lies by asserting a false statement ϕ, then cautious updating will not lead astray those agents who initially believe that ϕ is false: these agents will simply ignore the assertion all together. We contrast this with the approach of van Ditmarsch et al. (2010) , who propose that agents respond to a lie that asserts a false statement ϕ by executing Gerbrandy and Groeneveld's public announcement operation g(ϕ): delete all arrows whose target is a ¬ϕ-world, thereby accepting the false information ϕ without regard to one's prior beliefs about ϕ. One consequence of this approach is that an agent who initially believes that ϕ is false will respond to the lie asserting ϕ by coming to believe everything (including inconsistent statements), thereby trivializing the agent's beliefs. Cautious updating avoids this outcome and is therefore a better policy for responding to information coming from a trustworthy but occasionally faulty source. 4 The number of events in the arrow update CU(ϕ) grows linearly in the cardinality of A , whereas the action model A [CU(ϕ) ] grows exponentially in the cardinality of A . In the next section, we will show that the difference in the rates of growth between arrow updates and their equivalent Definition 4.6 action models is sometimes unavoidable. §6. Succinctness. Though arrow updates are no more expressive than action models (Theorem 4.7), we will see in this section that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. That is, we will show that there is a sequence of arrow updates such that k-th arrow update is of size (k) but the smallest equivalent action model is of size 2 (k) . In order to prove this claim, we will first define the notions of the length for formulas and of size for arrow updates and for action models. DEFINITION 6.1 (Length). We define the function len : F ∪ U → N by letting len(ϕ) be the number of occurrences of each symbol appearing in the expression ϕ; this includes parentheses, brackets, and commas and, for each a ∈ A and each p ∈ P, counts each of the expressions " 2 a ", " a", and " p" as a single symbol. For each X ∈ F ∪ U , we call len(X ) the length of X.
DEFINITION 6.2 (Size). Given an action model A and an arrow update U , we define the following natural-number quantities. n(A)
def = |E A | (number of events in A) m(A) def = a∈A |R A a | (number of arrows in A) p(A) def = e∈E A len(pre A (e)) (length of preconditions in A) s(A) def = m(A) + p(A) (size of A) s((ϕ, a, ϕ )) def = len(ϕ) + len(ϕ ) (size of (ϕ, a, ϕ )) s((ϕ, a, ϕ ), U ) def = s((ϕ, a, ϕ )) + s(U ) (size of (ϕ, a, ϕ ), U )
We have p(A) ≥ n(A) because len(pre A (e)) ≥ 1 for each e ∈ E A . Hence s(A) ≥ n(A).
We now define a sequence {U k } k∈N of arrow updates such that U k has size (k) and the Theorem 4.7 equivalent action model A k Proof. For each i ∈ N with i ≤ k, the triple (¬ p i , a, p i ) ∈ U contributes len(¬ p i ) + len( p i ) = 3 to the size. Since k + 1 pairwise distinct triples of this form occur in U , it follows that s(U k ) = 3k + 3. As for the size of A k , we have i ∈ N and i ≤ k}. Hence for each i ∈ N with i ≤ k, a maximal U k -consistent set has exactly one of the two sets {p i , ¬¬ p i } and {¬ p i } as a subset. Since a maximal U kconsistent set is a union of k + 1 pairwise disjoint sets, each of which has one of these two distinct forms, it follows that n(A k ) = 2 k+1 .
It will be our task to show that an action model having fewer than n(A k ) states cannot be update equivalent to U k . For convenience, we first define an auxiliary notion of modal equivalence between pointed Kripke models called 2 a -equivalence. DEFINITION 6.5. Given a ∈ A , to say that pointed Kripke models (M, w) and (M , w ) are 2 a -equivalent means that for each reduced formula ϕ, we have M, w | 2 a ϕ if and only if M , w | 2 a ϕ.
We now prove that any action modal having fewer than n(
states is not update equivalent to U k . Since the size of an action model is no less than the number of states in the action model, it therefore follows that no action model whose size is less than 2 (s(U k )) is update equivalent to U k . Hence arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. THEOREM 6.6 (Update Succinctness).
Proof. Fix k ∈ N and a ∈ A such that a appears in U k . Let C k denote the k-dimensional epistemic hypercube; that is, definingk def = {i ∈ N | i ≤ k}, we let C k be the Kripke model defined as follows.
Note that every world w ∈ W C k has a unique event in e w ∈ E A k such that C k , w | pre A k (e w ).
Suppose that w 1 and w 2 are two different worlds in C k . Therefore there is an i ∈k such that, without loss of generality,
Now let (A, E) be a multi-pointed action model having n(A) < n(A k ). We shall prove that (A, E) and U k are not update equivalent. Proceeding, define the functionsĒ :
If |Ē(w)| = 0 for some w ∈ W C k , then (A, E) and U k are not update equivalent because
So let us assume that |Ē(w)| > 0 for each w ∈ W C k . If there is a w ∈ W C k , an e 1 ∈Ē(w), an e 2 ∈Ē(w), and a reduced formula 2 a ϕ such that
follows that (A, E) and U k are not update equivalent.
So let us assume that for each w ∈ W C k , we have not only that |Ē(w)| > 0 but also that (C k [A], (w, e 1 ) ) and (C k [A], (w, e 2 )) are 2 a -equivalent for each e 1 ∈Ē(w) and each e 2 ∈Ē(w). Choosing an eventẽ w ∈Ē(w) for each w ∈ W C k , it follows from the assumption that C k , w | [A, E]2 a χ if and only if C k , w | [A, {ẽ w }]2 a χ if and only if C k [A] , (w,ẽ w ) | 2 a χ for each reduced formula 2 a χ. Since n(A) < n(A k ) = 2 k+1 = |W C k |, there is anê ∈ E A such that |W (ê)| ≥ 2; that is, there is a w 1 ∈W (ê) and a w 2 ∈W (ê) with w 1 = w 2 . For each v ∈W (ê) and each v ∈W (ê), it follows that (w, e) ∈ R 
are not 2 a -equivalent, and hence there is a reduced formula 2 a χ such that, without loss of generality, 
2 a χ and hence that (A, E) and U k are not update equivalent. §7. Common knowledge. Let F C 0 be the extension of the basic multi-modal language F 0 obtained by adding ordinary common knowledge operators C G for each group G ⊆ A of agents. Extending the language F C 0 by adding public announcement operators such a Plaza's operator [ϕ] p (Section §5) strictly increases language expressivity (Baltag et al., 2005; Renne, 2008) , which makes it impossible to prove completeness via the reduction axiom method of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag et al., 1998; Gerbrandy, 2007; Gerbrandy & Groeneveld, 1997; Plaza, 2007; van Benthem et al., 2006; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) . Since AUL can express public announcements (Section §5), adding AUL's arrow update modals [U ] to the language F C 0 also strictly increases language expressivity.
In the case of adding public announcement operators to F C 0 , one way to avoid the expressive increase is to begin with a base language F C+ 0 built by extending F 0 with a more expressive common knowledge operators C + G such as the operators of relativized common knowledge (Kooi & van Benthem, 2004; van Benthem et al., 2006) . We wish to do something similar for the case where we add arrow update modals [U ]: beginning with a base language F * 0 obtained by extending F 0 with new common knowledge operators 5 The argument for the case where
| 2 a χ is obtained by interchanging w 1 and w 2 in the remainder of the proof.
{U } * -here {U } * is viewed not as a belief change operator but instead as a certain kind of common knowledge operator that we define below-we will see that the further addition of update modals [U ] does not increase language expressivity. For brevity, we will approach this study by beginning with the full language F * obtained by extending F 0 with both common knowledge operators {U } * and belief-changing update modals [U ] . After defining a semantics for this language, we will develop a sound and complete axiomatics for the validities of the language with respect to the semantics. On the way to proving completeness, we will prove (in Theorem 7.8) that the full language F * and the fragment F * 0 obtained by omitting belief-changing update modals [U ] are equally expressive. DEFINITION 7.1 (AUL * Language). The grammar G * is defined as follows. in M begins at w 0 , ends at w n , and is from w 0 to w n . A step in a U -path w i n i=0 is a subsequence w j , w j+1 obtained by choosing some j ∈ N satisfying 0 ≤ j < n.
The semantics of ordinary common knowledge C G among a nonempty group G ⊆ A is given by defining M, (Fagin et al., 1995) . Since we have that
it follows that ordinary common knowledge is expressible in the language of AUL * .
Let M be a Kripke model. Given a world w ∈ W M , a formula ϕ, and a nonempty group G ⊆ A , a ϕ-G-path from w is a finite nonempty sequence w i n i=0 of worlds in M such that w 0 def = w, that n ≥ 1, that w i+1 ∈ a∈G R M a (w i ) for each i < n, and that M, w i | ϕ for each i ≤ n. A ϕ-G-path w i n i=0 is said to end on w n . The semantics of relativized common knowledge C G (ϕ, ψ) among a nonempty group G ⊆ A is given by defining M, w | C G (ϕ, ψ) to mean that M, v | ψ for each v ∈ W M such that there is a ϕ-G-path from w that ends at v (Kooi & van Benthem, 2004; van Benthem et al., 2006) . Since we have that
it follows that relativized common knowledge is expressible in the language of AUL * .
DEFINITION 7.3 ({U }ψ , U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ )). Let U be an AUL * -arrow update and a ∈ A be an agent. Let ψ, ψ , χ, and χ be AUL * -formulas. We define the expressions {U }ψ and U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ ) as follows.
• {U }ψ is the AUL * -formula defined by setting
• U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ ) is the AUL * -arrow update defined by setting
DEFINITION 7.4 (AUL * Theory). The axiomatic theory AUL * is defined in Proof. Assume that w i n i=0 is a U -path in M * U . This means that for each step Proof. By induction on the length of derivation in AUL * . We restrict our attention to the base case for Axiom U6 and the induction case for Rule *W. The other cases are straightforward adaptations of the arguments for ordinary common knowledge (Fagin et al., 1995) . Proceeding, we prove that Axiom U6 is valid. Let us now show that Rule *W is validity preserving. Proceeding, assume that | ψ → ψ and | χ → χ . We wish to argue that | {U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ )} * ϕ → {U } * ϕ. So let (M, w) be an arbitrary pointed Kripke model satisfying the property that M, w | {U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ )} * ϕ. It follows that for each U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ )-path w i n i=0 in M that begins at w, we have that M, w n | ϕ. But since | ψ → ψ and | χ → χ , it follows that every U -path in M is also a U (ψ/ψ , a, χ/χ )-path in M. Hence M, w | {U } * ϕ. Since M was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Rule *W is validity preserving. 
For each X ∈ F * ∪ U * , the number c(X ) is called the complexity of X.
Proof. We add the following equations to those in Table 2 .
As in the proof of AUL Reduction (Theorem 3.5), we then argue that the full collection of equations defines a function r : F * → F * . To see that these equations are complexity respecting, we note that we have c(U
by what was shown in the proof of AUL Reduction (Theorem 3.5). Further, since we have that
The equations are therefore complexity respecting. So to prove the statement of the theorem, one then argues by induction on the complexity k of AUL * -formulas that for each formula θ having c(θ) ≤ k, it follows that * θ ↔ r (θ). The argument is broken up into a number of cases, one for each of the forms of an AUL * -formula to which r is applied on the left side of an equation from either Proceeding, we prove that * {U } * ϕ ↔ r ({U } * ϕ). First, we have * ϕ ↔ r (ϕ) by the induction hypothesis (which may be applied by the fact that r : F * → F * is complexity respecting). Applying modal reasoning, it follows that * {U } * ϕ ↔ {U } * r (ϕ). But since we have that * {U } * r (ϕ) ↔ {r (U )} * r (ϕ) by repeated use of Rule *W and the induction hypothesis, the result follows.
Finally, we prove that Proof. As in the proof of AUL Completeness (Theorem 3.6), though making use of AUL * Soundness (Theorem 7.6) and AUL * Reduction (Theorem 7.8). Note that completeness of the reduced fragment of AUL * follows by a standard Fischer−Ladner-style finite model construction (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007, sec. 7 .3). 6 §8. Conclusion. We presented the theory AUL of Arrow Update Logic, a multi-agent doxastic theory for reasoning about belief changes brought about by epistemic arroweliminating operations called arrow updates. We provided a sound and complete axiomatization of AUL along with two examples of AUL-describable belief changes: public announcements (both Plaza's and Gerbrandy and Groeneveld's) and cautious updating. We proved that every belief-changing operation expressible using an arrow update U is expressible using the action model A[U ] of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. However, using action models can be expensive: we proved that arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models in expressing belief changes. These results give us half of the story about the relationship between arrow updates and action models: arrow updates can be expressed using action models but it is sometimes exponentially more 6 The reduced fragment of AUL * is the theory AUL * 0 obtained from AUL * by eliminating all axioms and rules that contain nonreduced formulas. The language of AUL * 0 consists of the set of reduced AUL * -formulas. expensive to do so. What remains for future work is to determine the other half of the story: which action models are expressible using arrow updates, and are action models sometimes exponentially more succinct than arrow updates?
Toward the end of this paper, we presented the theory AUL * of AUL with common knowledge operators {U } * . We proved that the language F * 0 obtained by adding these common knowledge operators to the basic multi-modal language F 0 is just as expressive as the language F * obtained by further extending F * 0 by adding arrow update modals [U ] (Theorem 7.8). While we showed that our common knowledge operators {U } * can express both ordinary and relativized common knowledge, it is an open question whether this expressive relationship holds the other way around (though we suspect that in each case it does not).
While the action models of DEL generalize Plaza's world-eliminating public announcements, the arrow updates of AUL generalize Gerbrandy and Groeneveld's arrow-eliminating public announcements, though the AUL generalization comes with an assumption that the way each of the agents responds to incoming information is common knowledge among the agents. In Kooi & Renne (2011) , we study the theory of Generalized Arrow Update Logic (GAUL), which drops this assumption. We achieve this by expanding the arrow specifications (ϕ, a, ϕ ) of AUL in a way that allows us to say that an a-arrow elimination happens privately for some subgroup of agents. The resulting generalized arrow updates of GAUL therefore have a more direct connection with Dynamic Epistemic Logic's action models: each generalized arrow update is update equivalent to an action model and each action model is update equivalent to a generalized arrow update. But mutual expressivity does not come for free. In particular, generalized arrow updates are at worst polyexponentially less succinct than action models, though this improves to being at worst less succinct if the action models have purely epistemic preconditions (i.e., preconditions not containing action models) or if we allow generalized arrow updates to have target conditions in the language of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Further, we showed that generalized arrow updates are sometimes exponentially more succinct than action models. See Kooi & Renne (2011) for details. Though GAUL allows us to drop the common knowledge assumption present in AUL, we still have not identified the exact update-expressive relationship between action models and AUL arrow updates, an important question for future research. §9. Acknowledgments. The authors thank Andreas Herzig, Ben Rodenhäuser, Hans van Ditmarsch, Guillaume Aucher, and an anonymous referee for their helpful feedback on the text.
